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October 28, 1962

TO: The

The Secretary

The Under Secretary G - The Deputy Under Secretary


FROM: S/P - W. W. Rostow

SUBJECT: Forward Implications of the Cuben Crisis
for Planning Tasks re the Soviets.

I commend to you this thoughtful memorandum of Mose Marvey's,

| DEPARTMENT OF STATE | 15, FPC, CDR - 5 Date: 7,3, 52 |
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FRUF: Hose Harvey

ೂಡಲ್: Forward Implications of the Cuban Crisis for Flamming Tasks re the Soviets

1. The Armements Problem. Assumption by the boviets of the rises and costs of the Cuban venture must be read as strong evidence that (a) our intelligence estimates of Soviet inferiority in long range felivery capability have been currect, and (b) the soviet leaters are anxious to offset this balance as quickly as possible. With regard to this offsetting problem, they may have been concerned to strengthen their sand for a Berlin ploy. It would be unvise, however, to assume this was their scle objective. It would seem probable they wanted ches; .. and quickly to improve their ever-all position. Cube may have teer simply a stop-gap pending Seviet catching up in IChM's; it may have been a hoped-for permanent substitute for massive numbers of 10304 (i.e., a means of insuring an all-round pay-off or the presumed earlier decision to place prime emphasis on IRBN and Much's); it may have been a nulcing operation to cover Soviet weakness while it continued to seek a nears of leap-frogging the necessity of developing a massive ICBF ca. ability.

It can hardly be assumed failure will result in the Soviet leaders becoming reconciled to their inferiority. I would think the reverse, that they will now be more anxious than ever to get themselves in a "position of atrength".

we consequently have more urgent need than ever to stay on top of the weatons development problem. Any simple surmine that the Sorieta vill not bear great streams and strains to get into a position of real equality, or superiority if at all possible, would be highly damperous. The Cuban affort would seem a direct refutation of this. Moreover, to the clear compulsions that were previously operating on them has now been added that of accepting a great and hamiliating defeat. We must, therefore, take out all the insurance we can to be sure there is no leap-freg.

Conversely, we should not close our eyes to possibilities of progress in armsents control. Assuming we do whetever is necessary to

leave the boviets under no illusions about our own intention to cover all icog-coles that might enable them to schieve a leap-frog — that is that we intend to do all that has to be done to keep shead at whatever cost and for whatever time period required — they may be willing at least to agree to blunting the edges of the area race, teginning with testing. (I hardly need point out the truly revolutionary break is, their old positions the line of retreat they have taken constitutes,) we have reach, therefore, to be imaginative in formulating safe but constructive proposals on disarmament, that is to survey the field and see which unnecessary impediments in our own approach can be thrown out.

2. jarlin. The unsuccessful test of our resolve in the Guben crisis would make it seem unlikely that the Soviets will want to mount another crisis which would again put them in a position where it will have to wrist var or teck down. We would seem, therefore, to have youd prejects of getting Serlin put on ice, and proceedy on conditions that would restore more normal conditions between test-berlin and sesterain, we might even be able to get the wall down, or at least to get its rigilities relaxed. Parhaps we will have to do this under cover of a secarate Seviet-Sast German peace treaty that would not affect may of our rights.

The planning problem on Berlin is, then, to work out a program of nagotiations on Berlin that will insure our getting what we want, but will show Ecomemon on our part insofar as unessentials are concerned.

3. (tibs. It may wall be that Khrushchev's decision to abandon the bases in Guba will end up being a decision to abandon Guba. Initially, Moscov will probably seek to play the these that it has insured the "inde, endenne of wiba" which was its "only objective" all along. But Khrushchev oan hardly see where any money is to be made in Guba in the light of the firmmess with which we dealt with the bases. Continued large-scale help may consequently be viewed as a profitless undertaking, from the standpoint of both Guba and Latin America generally.

The planning task we face is to check out the above possibility and to work out a follow-up in Cube that will maximise the prospect of getting rid of lastro once and for all. -ur concentration should, of course, be on the Cuben people themselves. With the Soviet backdown, Castroism should increasingly be viewed as bankrupt, as offering nowhere to go but downard. Resstablishmant of normal relations with the US and other American states will necessarily seem increasingly attractive.

2. Communist China. The Soviet backdows, as well as any improvements. Its attacepharies that may follow, will have a devastating impact on vince-order relations. This may not be apparent initially. It is conceivable, in fact, that initially the Soviet backdows will be secred by a felping retract, in the first instance in the conflict with Initia. But basically the Soviet performance should turn out something of a last straw to the Chinese. The repercussions should not stop with versening relations between the two, but should repeate added pressures for a change in basic orientation of the regime, (i.e., pressures to go down the littoist track). There might first, of course, be a new try at bail-out through some irrational approach, but this would almost inevitably turn out counter-productive in the end, increasing rather than redweing the shames of an altimate basic change.


Our planning need is, therefore, to get going with a refinement and modification of our Coims policy that will be designed to maximize the chances of getting the Chinese Community problem better in hand.

- 5. General Responsisel of there the Soviets Stand. We have two broad possibilities of what the future may bring:
- The Ahrushobar leadership may have resorted to the Cuban venture in the hope of quickly and cheaply recouping from the sethese they have in fact suffered and as means of putting themselves in a better position to push forward again. Cub may, in other words, have been a last ditch try to get shough out of their post-Sputaik offensive to keep the ball rolling or at least to keep it from alipping downhill. Juba naving falled, the leadership may now be prepared to modify substantially their intentions and expectations researching the cold war. They may be prepared, in simplest terms, to have a go at gesuine co-existence.
- The leadership may have thought Cuba would constitute a leap-frog. This not having happened, they may simply redouble their efforts to redress the power balance through more coetly but surer efforts at home. They may true seek a quieting of tensions pending the results of a further arms build-up.

In developing our policy, we should assume the first of these possibilities, but safeguard against the second.

To capitalise on a possible Soviet basic reappraisal of the marite of continuing at this stage sative prosecution of the cold war, we need to drive for arrangements that will improve the free world position at the various erisis points moted above and in other ways, that is, to





The basic problem lies in this: We can afford to operate on the basic assumption that the Sowiet Union is a second class power, but we should recognize the great difficulty the Sowiet leadership will have in accepting such a role in a fully undisquised form. Atmospherics, still fully brought to bear, can in this circumstance be of decisive innortance.

we should keep in mind the strong possibility that important elements in the soviet leadership, perhaps including the military, are opposed to anything more than a passing "bowing to the wind". That the Gulan venture was undertaken at all adds weight to this possibility. Acreover, the strange performance re "the Khrushchev letters" suggest both differences and arguments within the leadership, and gives at least some reason to believe that a "hard" group may have at one point sold or forced a last go at prelonging risks to try to salvage something from the operation.

but in another way, the basic problem we now face is to attempt to capitalise on the turn of events (and hare I have in mind not just the Cuban incider' but the entire preceding tread of events) by going for a beginning of a liquidation of the sold war. For this we should exploit the victory we have gained not alone through esisting and maling down redoubts from which we can better press the Soviets in the future, but also through making every effort to corrince the Seviets of the intrinsic futility and managementations of the heatile course which they have pursued since the end of the war.

The planning challenge is that we device policies that will asximise the chances of transforming a great particular victory into a historic turn in the whole course of post-were world relations.

6, All of the above involves, of course, planning tasks and afforts over a very long period. It is essential, however, that we keep in mind the problems posed from the very first. From this point on, any slight bend in the tudg can have great moment for the direction of future growth.

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